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This study is an attempt to formulate a monetary policy reaction function for India. In particular I model backward and 
forward  looking  Taylor  and  McCallum  rules  for  the  period  post  BoP  crisis.  It  is  found  that  backward-looking 
McCallum rule tracks the evolution of monetary base over the sample period reasonably well, suggesting that RBI acts 
as if it is targeting nominal income when conducting monetary policy. Recent declaration by the RBI that reserve 
money is its operating target (Annual Reports, 2001-02 and 2002-03) lends support to the findings of the study.   
I. Introduction  
It s been more than a decade since the financial sector reforms began in India and an important 
question currently facing the policy makers is that of the selection of an appropriate regime for 
conducting monetary policy; in a situation where the structural reforms have only partially taken 
effect and, more importantly, are still underway. Under such a scenario it would be useful to see 
what the Indian central bank can learn from the recent developments in the area of rules for 
monetary policy.  
In this study I attempt to operationalise Taylor (1993a) type rules for the Indian economy. After 
Taylor s popular paper on rules versus discretion where he described the evolution of the U.S. 
Federal funds rate after mid  80s as a function of output and inflation gap, literature on such 
monetary policy  reaction functions
 
has been abounding. Even though reaction functions per se 
have been around for many years (Khoury, 1992), Taylor s paper reignited interest in the area and 
now  the  term  Taylor  rule  has  almost  become  synonymous  with  monetary  policy  reaction 
functions.   
I  set  out  to  estimate  such  monetary  policy  reaction  functions  for  the  Indian  economy,  with 
monetary base (termed in the literature as the McCallum Rule) and interest rate (Taylor Rule) as 
alternative operating targets. In this study I model both the backward looking (on the lines of 
Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) and the forward looking versions of the reaction functions (on the 
lines of Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 2000; henceforth CGG). While prior to mid  90s, high 
degree of monetization of deficits made such an exercise quite for India meaningless, lack of high 
frequency contemporaneous data on output and output gap also made it impracticable.   
After a brief discussion on the price stability as the main goal of monetary policy in Section II, I 
discuss the literature on  Taylor-type rules in  Section III. In  Section IV I discuss the issues associated  with  using  Taylor-type  rules  for  monetary  policy  and  describe  the  methodology. 
Section V describes the estimation strategy and reports the results. Section VI is a discussion of 
results  against  the  backdrop  of  the  monetary/macro  developments  in  India  in  the  late  90s. 
Section VII concludes after performing an out-of-sample check of the results.    
II. Price Stability  
If there is one area in the theory of monetary policy that has the consensus of both academicians 
and practitioners it is that of price stability as the main target of monetary policy. Today, central 
banks of most developed countries use price level or inflation rate in some form or the other as 
their main target of monetary policy. Academicians though, still like to think about the decision 
problem in terms of the traditional loss function, with both inflation and the gap between actual 
real GDP and potential GDP as the arguments.
1 There are some economists, however, who argue 
that the most suitable objective of monetary policy is the nominal income.
2   
Rangarajan (1997) reminds us that monetary policy is just a tool to achieve the broad economic 
policy objectives of a faster rate of economic growth, a reasonable degree of price stability, and 
promotion  of  distributive  justice.  In  this  situation  of  equally  desirable  objectives,  and  the 
constraint on equality of number of instruments and objectives, he argues that, monetary policy 
seems to be best suited to achieving the goal of price stability. Settling for price stability as the 
chief objective of monetary policy he claims that:  
Inflation  control  policies  should  not  be  viewed  as  inimical  to  growth  promotion 
policies [and]  it  is  possible  to  contain  the  inflationary  pressure  on  the  economy,  while 




Macroeconomic  theory  tells  us  that  in  the  long-run
4  monetary  policy  cannot  influence  real 
magnitudes. In keeping with that and the above discussion, this study works on the premise of 
ensuring price stability as the main long-term goal of the monetary policy in India.   
                                                
 
1 See Svensson (1999)  
2 See McCallum (1984) and Taylor (1985) 
3 C. Rangarajan,  The Role of Monetary Policy , EPW, December 27, 1997, p. 3325   
4 The  long-run  here refers to the notion that the economy has  absorbed  both demand and supply shocks III. Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: The Taylor and the McCallum Rule  
Before proceeding an important thing that needs to be understood regarding the monetary policy 
reaction functions is that rules are just a tool in the toolbox of the central banker. A central banker 
possesses (or at least is expected to possess!) a number or macro models assisting it in making 
monetary policy decisions. Monetary policy reaction functions are what they are 
 
simplified 
representations  of  a  central  bank s  behaviour  relating  the  evolution  of  (monetary  policy) 
instruments to changes in goals (price and output) and intermediate targets (interest rate/money 
growth rate/exchange rate). As shown by Taylor (1993b), Levin, Wieland and Williams (1997) 
and Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), such reaction functions when calibrated/estimated with an 
IS curve and a backward looking/expectation augmented Phillips Curve, stabilize inflation and 
output reasonably well in a variety of macro models and are thus worthy of study.  
Also, monetary policy rules are a good way of summarizing a central banker s behaviour on the 
operating  target  of  its  choice,  giving  its  likely  behaviour  based  on  information  about  future 
inflation and output gap. Rules add to enhancing credibility of the bank that it has its eyes on its 
goals and helps facilitating discussions both within the bank and with the academic/professional 
community.   
 
Interest Rate Targeting   The Taylor Rule
5   
Though the rule that Taylor  designed
 
was for the level of operating targets, for the U.S. it 
actually relates the value of the intermediate target relying on the aggregate demand channel and 
transmission  via  changes  in  the  interest  rate  structure.  Although  the  rule  was  developed 
empirically, Taylor (1998) argues, it can be easily derived from the quantity theory equation.
6 
Also, as shown by Assuming away the lags in the response of velocity to interest rates or income 
changes, and using (stationary) output gap instead of real output, he comes with up with the 
following linear equation:  










                                                
 
5 Made popular by Prof. John Taylor of Stanford University; See Taylor (1993a, 1993b, 1998) 
6 Noting that the velocity of money depends on the interest rate and real output the quantity theory equation can be 
reduced to the form of the Taylor equation. where i is the short term interest rate, 
 
is the inflation rate, expressed as annualized percentage 
changes in the price level, 
*is the targeted inflation rate, and  z
 
is the output gap expressed as 
annualized percentage deviation of real output from trend (in logarithms).  
In the above equation the parameters
*, 




are treated as constants. Thus, given the 
values of 
 
and z for any period the Taylor rule suggests the target value of the short term 
nominal  interest  rate  i.  Taylor  (1993a)  showed  that  the  following  equation  gave  a  good 
description of the Fed s interest rate for the period 1987-1992:  









This implies an inflation target of 2%, an average short-term real rate of 2%, and an equal weight 
on output gap and the deviation of inflation from the target. On whether a rule derived from 
empirical observation can serve as a general guideline for monetary policy Taylor asserts from his 
studies that the basic results about simple rules designed for the United States apply to most 
developed countries.
7  
Apart  from  Taylor s  (1993a)  own  study  which  assumes  parameter  values,  there  have  been 
subsequently been attempts to fit the rule using formal econometric procedures. CGG (1998, 
2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Kozicki (1999) do so for the US while Nelson (2000), 
using the rule as  a guide, describes the evolution of the  monetary  policy  in the UK. Taylor 
(1993b) and CGG (1998) report estimates for the UK, Japan, France, Italy and Germany using 
backward and forward looking versions of the rule respectively.  
In  practice  the  use  of  interest  rates  as  the  main  policy  instrument  has  often  taken  place  in 
conjunction with some inflation target. In other words, policymakers set an  inflation target - 
explicitly  or  implicitly  -  and  change  interest  rates  with  the  aim  of  achieving  such  a  target. 
Though, here Sims
 
(2003) warning should be taken heed of, that such a policy is effective only if 
the central bank is  actually  able to control inflation.  
A rule in  competition  to the popular Taylor rule is the McCallum rule using monetary base as 
the operating instrument based on nominal income targeting, which is described next.  
                                                
 
7 See Taylor (1993b)  
Nominal Income Targeting   The McCallum Rule
8   
In the literature this is the only rule that propounds adjustment in the growth rate of the monetary 
base when the target (of nominal GDP) is not achieved. From the Quantity Theory of Money we 















where Mo  is the exogenous money  supply, P is the aggregate price level, and V the income 
velocity  of  money.  The  theory  offers  an  adequate  picture  of  reality  where  macroeconomic 
demand is markedly determined by changes in money supply.  






























is the growth rate of the nominal GDP target
9. Now, with the forecast values for 
growth rate of output (Y) and velocity (V), and the targeted inflation rate  ) ( , a target growth 
rate for the money stock (M) can be calculated. Given the money multiplier (m), the target growth 
rate for the monetary base can be derived from:  
. . .











At this juncture note that if fluctuations in the income velocity of circulation are ignored nominal 
GDP targeting may appear identical to monetary targeting. However, Bofinger (2001) argues, this 
is not the case. While monetary targeting results in a medium-term targeting of monetary growth, 
nominal GDP targeting is an activist policy leading to countercyclical fluctuations in the money 
                                                
 
8 Made popular by Prof. Bennett McCallum of Carnegie Mellon University; See McCallum (1988, 1993, 1999) 
9  dot  on top of the variables represent (annualized) growth rates supply growth. Also, monetary targeting cannot ensure that the (implicit) nominal target will be 
met unless, in the very special case, the long run trend of velocity equals the actual growth rate.   
Having  build  the  underlying  premise  let  us  look  at  how  McCallum  (1988,  1993,  1999)  has 
translated it into a rule calling for changing in the growth rate of monetary base in advent of the 
nominal income target not being met. Combining equations [4] and [6] we have,  
. . . .













b V V m
 
we  can  write  the  above  equation  in  terms  of  the  rate  of  variation  of 
velocity of circulation of the monetary base (
.
b V ). Thus,  
. . .











However, McCallum does not use the rule in this form. For the velocity of circulation he uses not 
the actual value, but the average velocity of circulation of the monetary base for the last sixteen 
quarters. Also, McCallum supplements his rule by a term that takes temporary fluctuations in 
nominal GDP into account. He uses the difference of the logs of actual value of the nominal GDP 
and its trend, so that the determining equation for the monetary base is:  
. . .





B Y V lnY lnY
16
10      [9]  
where he uses the value of 0.25 for  .  
Thus, according to the McCallum rule, the central bank must increase the growth rate in the 
monetary base if the actual value of nominal GDP in the preceding period is below its target/trend 
value and vice versa.   
McCallum (1999) has shown that for the US, his rule has agreed with the more-popular Taylor 
rule over many periods but differed in the case of the UK when his  would have called for 
                                                
 
10 Here lnY
o represents natural logarithm of nominal income tighter policy and Taylor s for looser.
11
 
He further argues that for Japan during the years 1995-
1998, when understanding was that   
monetary policy could provide no more stimulus in Japan because interest rates were 
already as low as they could  go a  policy rule that uses the  monetary base as an  essential 




Here note that the choice of the operating target in both the rules is not sacrosanct. If there is a 
stable relationship between the velocity of monetary base and the short term interest rate, an 
analog to the McCallum rule can be cast in terms of the short term interest rate and vice versa.   
It would be apparent from the description of aforementioned rules that the performance of a 
particular  regime  would  crucially  depend  on  the  parameters  of  the  rules.  While  monetary 
targeting, premised on stable demand for money function, is fairly well understood in the Indian 
context
13, there does not seem to be any study on the estimation of monetary policy reaction 
functions in the Indian context. This study is an attempt to fill that gap to see if  rules
 
offer any 
insights in the way RBI has conducted monetary policy in the period post liberalization.    
IV. Issues in the Estimation of Taylor-type Rules   The Methodology  
Although  McCallum  (1997)  and  Kozicki  (1999)  discuss  in  some  detail  the  theoretical  and 
practical issues respectively in the design/estimation of monetary policy rules, I delineate here the 
main methodological concerns. I have divided them in the following sub-categories, as:  
 
Inclusion of other Macroeconomic Aggregates: Exchange Rate/Money Supply  
 
Dynamics of Adjustment: Interest Rate Smoothing  
 
Data: Measures for Output, Output Gap and Inflation  
 
Vintage of Data Used: Advanced vs. Revised Estimates?  
 
Backward Looking (OLS) vs. Forward Looking (GMM) version of the rules  
 
Unit Root Tests: Are Inflation and interest rates series stationary? 
                                                
 
11 McCallum op cit. p. 13 
12 McCallum op cit. p. 16 
13 Rao (1997), Jadhav (1994), and Arif (1996) are some examples Although in the discussion that follows issues are presented with reference to rules with interest 
rate as the operating target, they are equally important and relevant for rules cast with monetary 
base as the instrument of choice.   
Before discussing each of above issues in detail, to facilitate discussion, let us look at the original 
Taylor (1993a) rule. The original Taylor rule in estimable form can be represented as:  









* * r , and 
*
t t t z y y  the above equation can be simplified to:  












t i  is the recommended short-interest rate from the rule, 
* r  is the long run equilibrium real 
rate, 
*is the target inflation rate,  t
 
is the average inflation rate over the past four quarters 
(including  the  contemporaneous  quarter),  and 
*
t t t z y y
 
is  the  output  gap  expressed  as 
(annualized) deviation of logarithm of real GDP from the potential.    
 
Inclusion of other Macroeconomic Aggregates: Exchange Rate/Money Supply?  
While for the U.S. interest rate serves as both the operating and the intermediate target, and 
Taylor rule can be interpreted as a rule for the evolution of the intermediate target, for India, it is 
almost  an  accepted  fact  that  till  mid  90s,  RBI,  under  Dr.  Rangarajan,  almost  exclusively 
targeted money growth rate for whatever leeway it had in using its instruments, with effectively 
fully regulated financial markets. However, if official releases of RBI (various Annual Reports 
since 1997/98) are any indication, it is moving to a  multiple indicator targeting
 
approach with 
repo rate as the chief operating instrument. Introduction of the Liquidity Adjustment Facility 
(LAF)  in  2000  to  better  manage  liquidity  in  the  repo/reverse  repo  market  is  a  step  in  that 
direction, and RBI is actively using its refinancing window to move the short term interest rate in 
the direction it deems appropriate. Although, of late RBI has declared (in Annual Reports for the 
years 2001-02 and 2002-03) that it is using monetary base as the official operating target.  To assess if exchange rate/money growth have been quantitatively important 
 
during the sample 
under study 
 
for the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in its monetary policy decision making, in 
addition to the base line model, I estimate the rules augmented with exchange rate. To see if 
money is important in the event RBI s implicit intermediate target is interest rate, I experiment 
with growth rate and deviation of money growth from the target/projected (as announced in the 
monetary and credit policy) as alternative additional independent variables.    
 
Dynamics of Adjustment: Interest Rate Smoothing  
As is well known (e.g. Goodfriend, 1991 and Svensson, 1997) most central banks using interest 
rate as the predominant instrument for monetary policy indulge in smoothing of interest rates. 
Notwithstanding the monetary conditions they refrain from drastic interest rate cuts/increases, 
mostly for fear of overreactions in the asset markets.   
Thus, if the rule warrants a rate 
*
t i
14, the central bank would act as to change the rate only 
smoothly. An accepted way of representing such behaviour is to assume that actual rate gradually 
adjusts to the desired as:  










where 0 1captures the observed smoothing in the value of the instrument by the bank.   
In this study it is assumed that the Indian central bank indulges in smoothing of the instrument. 
Thus, the estimable backward looking form takes the form:  







which can be simplified to:  




[14]   
                                                
 
14 Even though the discussion  takes  interest rate as the instrument of choice, it is not to mean that a priori interest rate 
is the preferred instrument for the Indian central bank Similar first-degree dynamics of adjustment has been assumed for growth rate of monetary base 
for use in the McCallum rule and the resulting  rule  takes the form:  
. . .
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
k 1
b
t t 1 t j t 1 t 1 t
j 0
1





* * ( )( ) 1 y and 
* * ( ) y
 
is the target (long run) growth rate in nominal 
output.   
 
Data: Measures for Output, Output Gap and Inflation  
In this study, for output I employ the quarterly output series created by Virmani and Kapoor 
(2003) in conjunction with the official series released by the CSO. For inflation I alternatively use 
four  quarter  average  (including  contemporaneous)
15  of  annualized  headline  inflation  rate,  the 
Wholesale  Price  Index  -  All  Commodities  Index  (1993-94  =  100),  four  quarter  average  of 
annualized 49/50 trimmed mean (see Virmani, 2003) and a proxy for  core  inflation from an 
unobserved components model (UCM 3) estimated in Virmani (2004b). See Exhibit 1 for plots.  
Estimation of output gap is one issue that has surprisingly not been given its due importance in 
the literature on rules. Studies working on the U.S. data either take a log linear/quadratic trend or 
conveniently relegate the responsibility on selecting the appropriate numeraire for output gap to 
as defined by the Congressional Budget Office . For a country like the U.S. existence of an 
official output gap series only adds to the simplicity associated with application of the rules. 
However, for a country like India, where release of the quarterly output series itself is a recent 
affair, estimation of output gap is a concern that needs to be addressed.   
A  short-cut  often found in the literature is the use of Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter (HP) to 
proxy the long term trend of output. Virmani (2004b) reviews the literature on the techniques 
used to estimate the output gap and provides output gap estimates for India using both univariate 
and bivariate unobserved components models. In this study I use the estimates from the models 
UCM 2 and UCM 3 as created in that study. See Exhibit 2 for plot of output gaps from HP, the 
Modified HP, UCM 2 and UCM 3. See Virmani (2004b) for details. 
                                                
 
15 For McCallum rule, however, point-to-point inflation has been used; as required by construction of the rule  
Vintage of Data Used  
Orphanides (1997) was amongst the first
16 to recognize the consequences of delay in availability 
of macroeconomic data in operation of simple Taylor-type policy rules. He found that    
the analysis [was] based on unrealistic assumptions about the timeliness of 
data availability. This permits rule specifications that are not operational and ignore difficulties 




He repeatedly finds that the magnitude of the errors associated with using different vintage of 
data used is substantial and sometimes within-year    
revisions in the policy recommendations are also quite large with a standard 




Rather than taking his observations as a negative criticism, what is important is due appreciation 
of the informational problems associated with macroeconomic data like output, and inflation and 
end of sample sensitivity of output gap estimates. The central bank can over time observe the 
likely  direction  of  data  revisions  based  on  other  (high  frequency)  indicators  (e.g.  index  of 
industrial  production  data,  which  is  available  monthly;  rainfall  estimates  from  the  Indian 
Meteorological  Department  with  which  RBI  does  keep  in  touch)  and  incorporate  that  in 
application of the rules.  
Since it is the  advanced  output estimates that are available to the central bank when it has to act, 
it makes little sense to use the revised quarterly estimates of output. For period post 1996-97 
while data on advanced estimates is available (taken to be the first releases of quarterly estimates 




on its website as 
and when the quarterly estimates are available 
 
normally with a lag of one/two quarters), for 
earlier periods I use the (pro rata) imputed quarterly advance estimates for output, i.e. I take the 
division of revised estimates into four quarters and apply that to the  first  estimate of output as 
announced by the CSO.  
                                                
 
16 Since then the problem has been emphasized by Orphanides and van Norden (1999), Orphanides (2003), Orphanides 
et al (2000) and Nelson and Nikolov (2001) among others  
17 ibid p. 1 
18 ibid p. 1  
Backward Looking (OLS) vs. Forward Looking (GMM) version of the Rules  
From the  original  backward  looking  version  of  the Taylor  rule, specification  of  the  rule has 
undergone fine tuning from the forward looking reaction function of CGG (1998, 2000) and 
Nelson (2000), the mixed version of Mehra (1999), to the real time analog of Orphanides (2003) 
which he used to conduct a historical analysis of monetary policy rules, the versions have been 
abounding.   
If survey of the literature is any indication, while the forward looking versions of CGG are now a 
standard (see the June 1999 special issue of the Journal of Monetary Economics which covered 
the Sveriges Riksbank 
 
IIES Conference on Monetary Policy Rules, June 1998) with Orphanides 
(1997) and Orphanides and van Norden s (1999) caveat on the importance of vintage of data used 
in operation of the rules.  
As Estrella and Fuhrer (2002, 2003) have shown not only are backward looking rules fit the data 
better, they also find them to be more stable in macroeconomic models (along with suitable IS 
and Phillips curve specifications), especially to monetary regime shifts. In line with their finding, 
in this study I employ both the original Taylor rule in its estimable form (equation [15]) and in the 
form as used by CGG.  
Specifically, the estimable form of baseline backward and forward looking Taylor and McCallum 
rules are given below:   
 
Backward Looking Taylor Rule:   




[15]   
 
Backward Looking McCallum Rule  
. . .
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
k 1
b
t t 1 t j t 1 t 1 t
j 0
1





* * ( )( ) 1 y ;
* * y  is the target (long run) growth rate in nominal output. 
A priori  0, 0, 0, 0, 0
 The above backward looking specifications can be estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent Newey-West covariance matrix.   
 
Forward Looking Taylor Rule   




[17]   
where the error terms is a combination of the forecast errors of inflation and output and the 
exogenous disturbance term  t , i.e.   
( ) ( )( [ | ]) ( [ | ]) t t n t n t t n t n t t 1 1 E I z E z I
 
 
[18]    
 
Forward Looking McCallum Rule   
. . .
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
k 1
b
t t 1 t j t n t n t
j 0
1




where, the error term  t
 
in this case is given as:  





[20]   
Clearly, for the forward looking versions, not only are the error terms autocorrelated (having an 
MA (n-1) structure
19), they are also correlated with explanatory variables precluding the use of 
OLS for estimation. Assuming the central bank has in its information set  t I
 
at time t, a set of 
variables  t u
 
such that  [ | ] t t E u 0
 
(the orthogonality conditions) the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) can be used to estimate the rules in the forward looking form. 
                                                
 
19 Correlation arises out of the choice of the horizon; for a horizon of one year (= four quarters), three forecast errors 
add up over the horizon. In the event horizons for inflation and output gaps are different, representation takes the form 
MA(q); q = max(m, n) - 1 Note that from the above formulations while we cannot independently  determine both 
* i and 
*in the Taylor rule, in the McCallum rule it is 
* y and 
*
 
that is contained in the intercept  . 
In both cases one of them must be assumed to get the implied value of the other. As is the 
common practice, sample average would be used to get the equilibrium value of the nominal 
interest  rate
20.  An  advantage ,  however,  in  the  McCallum  Rule  is  that  it  does  not  require 
estimation of the unobserved output gap.   
 
Unit Root Tests  
In the equations [15] and [16] as above while the standard Dickey Fuller tests are seen to find a 
unit root in all the series, i.e. interest rate, inflation, output and monetary base, those tests are 
plagued by very low power in small samples. Relying on the study of Virmani (2004a) which 
compares results from modified (and importantly, more powerful) versions of Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillip-Perron unit root tests on Indian macroeconomic data, both interest rate and inflation series 
are taken to be integrated of order zero in small sample and accordingly equations [15] & [16] 
and [17] & [19] are treated as stationary and can be estimated using OLS and GMM respectively 
(after adjusting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual  t ) without any fear of 
spurious regression.   
V. Data and Estimation Results: 1992Q3   2001Q4  
In this section I present results for both backward looking and forward looking versions of Taylor 
and  McCallum  Rules.  As  pointed  out  earlier  while  OLS  is  used  for  estimation  of  backward 
looking formulations, for forward looking rules I employ GMM. Horizon for (short to medium 
term) policy making in case of forward looking version is alternatively taken to be n = 1 and n = 
4 (quarters). For instruments, as is common practice (CGG, 1998, 2000 and Favero, 2001 are 
some examples), I use 1 and 4 quarter lags for each variable entering the regression and a vector 
of unity. In all the cases considered in the study, number of orthogonality conditions exceeds the 
number  of  parameters  to  be  estimated.  Overidentifying  conditions  can  be  tested  using  the  J 
                                                
 
20 As CGG (1998) note, a consequence of using sample average to proxy equilibrium real rate is that in a correctly 
specified model implied inflation rate would never be very far from the sample average either. statistic which is distributed as 
2
 
with the degree of freedom equal to the number of  excess 
identifying conditions. Hamilton (1994) provides the details.   
Rules are estimated on both the complete sample and a reduced sample with observations for four 
quarters removed starting the fourth quarter of 1997. The period from 1997Q3 
 
1998Q4 in the 
Indian economy was extremely tumultuous, with an extremely volatile foreign exchange market, 
sanctions, slowdown in output growth combined with fears of spillovers from the South East 
Asian and the Russian crisis. Here is a snapshot of the economic situation then.   
The South East Asian crisis started around the second quarter of 1997. Starting the second quarter 
of 1997, till the last quarter of 1998, not only did the Indian economy had to deal with speculative 
pressures in the foreign exchange market owing to the crisis, post Pokhran nuclear tests in May 
1998 it also had to face unprecedented economic sanctions from the international community. 
The period was marked by RBI s excessive interventions in the foreign exchange market post 
South East Asian Crisis (around 1997Q3), Pokhran tests (May 1998), and the inflows from the 
Resurgent Indian Bonds (around 1998Q3), coupled by a recession and lack of aggregate demand 
and temporary supply shocks around the first quarter of 1998 (mostly owing to sharp price rise of 
a  few  primary  articles,  particularly  fruits  and  vegetables).  As  RBI s  1997-98  Annual  Report 
notes,  
The overall growth momentum slackened in 1997-98 with agricultural sector posting a 
negative growth and industrial sector continuing to be sluggish. Real GDP growth in 1997-98 
was placed at 5.1 per cent as per the Revised Estimates year 1997-98 was marked by a relative 




In such a situation, while a textbook would demand a loose monetary policy to pump-prime the 
economy, in reality RBI sucked the liquidity to curb speculations in the foreign exchange market. 
As RBI further notes,  
in the light of the pressures in the foreign exchange market between November 1997 
and January 1998. These pressures were required to be contained by monetary policy measures 
that  impact  on  the  liquidity  position  and  through  it,  the  interest  rates Given  the  economic 
                                                
 
21 RBI 1997-98 Annual Report,  Money, Credit and Prices,  Chapter 3 environment engendered by the currency crises in the South-East Asian region, the proposal to 
reduce CRR by two percentage points, envisaged in October 1997, could not materialize in full 
during 1997-98. On the other hand, CRR was raised with effect from December 6, 1997 and 
January 17, 1998 to siphon off liquidity and control the arbitrage opportunities that arose on 
account  of  relatively  low  call  money  rates  and  gains  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  This 
measure was supplemented by other measures on January 16, 1998 such as a hike in both Bank 
Rate and repo rate by two percentage points, reduction in access to refinance facilities, and an 
increase in interest rate surcharge on bank credit for imports. These measures were successful in 
restoring orderly conditions in the forex market. With the stabilization of conditions in the foreign 
exchange  market,  the  Reserve  Bank  could  in  March  and  April  of  1998  reverse  most  of  the 




Since the situation was indeed quite problematic, it must be checked if that period (normalcy was 
regained only around the third quarter of 1998, well after Pokhran tests) had any marked effects 
on the estimation results. Thus, I estimate the rules on the  truncated  sample too.  
In November 1998, Dr. Rangarajan left to give way to Dr. Bimal Jalan as the governor of the 
central bank. To see if change of the central banker had an effect on the stance of monetary policy 
(weight on arguments appearing in the rule), I introduce a (slope) dummy for data after the third 
quarter of 1998 against output gap (nominal income gap in case of the McCallum rule), inflation 
gap, and deviation of M3  from target
23. This I check for both the complete and the truncated 
sample. Thus, in all, I estimate four versions each (full sample and truncated, both with and 
without dummy) of the backward and the forward looking rules. Also, for each version, I use 
three different numeraires for inflation, namely WPI, Trimmed Mean, and  core  inflation from 
UCM 3. With WPI and Trimmed Mean I use UCM 2 as the measure for potential output, and with 
core  inflation, I use UCM 3 for potential output
24.   
To see if money is quantitatively important (anymore) for setting the value of the short term rate, 
I experimented with both growth rate of M3 and deviation of M3 from target, and found deviation 
of M3 from target to be more significant. To proxy exchange rate, I include percentage change in 
                                                
 
22 RBI 1997-98 Annual Report,  Monetary and Economic Policy Environment,  Chapter 1 
23 No dummy was added to exchange rate, as with the benefit of hindsight, both the central bankers have been attentive 
to the external value of the Rupee.  
24 UCM 3 corresponds to the measure associated with CORE 3. See for Virmani (2004b) for details.  36 country trade weighted REER in both the Taylor and the McCallum rules. For the measure of 
velocity  in  McCallum  rule  I  have  used  eight  quarter  moving  average  (including  the 
contemporaneous  quarter)  of  velocity  of  adjusted  monetary  base
25.  At  this  point  it  would  be 
important to emphasize that in McCallum rule adjusted (for CRR) monetary base has been used 
applying the formula proposed by Rangarajan and Singh (1984).   
All  estimations  have  been  carried  out  in  MATLAB  v.  6.5  using  the  Econometric  Toolbox 
developed by Prof. James LeSage of University of Toledo, Ohio
26. For GMM estimation MINZ 
library (prepared by Prof. Mike Cliff of Purdue University) complementing the toolbox is used. 
Results are presented in Exhibits 3 to 8. Discussion follows.   
VI. Discussion  
In this section I evaluate econometrically and factually the results of the regressions in Section V. 
Clearly it would be futile to expend time and space on results from all the estimated versions. The 
idea  behind  using  different  measures  was  not  only  to  check  the  sensitivity  of  rules  to  the 
numeraire, sample period and estimation strategy but also to ensure a degree of rigour in the 
econometric analyses.   
For purpose of analysing RBI s monetary policy stance I would be discussing only those results, 
which bear a degree of semblance to the value of the operating target during the sample period 
and overall significance of the regressions. Thus, main criteria for evaluation are the ability of the 
rule to track the movements in the operating target (especially as it relates to  tightening
 
or 
loosening ), the implied value of the target inflation rate, and last but not least, statistical and 
economic significance of variables appearing on the right hand side.    
 
The Taylor Rule  
The first thing that becomes clear from results both forward looking and backward looking rules 
is the importance of exchange rate and deviation of growth rate of M3 from target in explaining 
the variation of the short rate over time. Also, apparent is the strong autoregressive nature of the 
                                                
 
25 Results were insensitive to the length of the moving average used. Regressions using four, five, six and seven quarter 
moving averages did not lead to substantially different results  
26 Available for download from  http://www.spatial-econometrics.com
 
 movement in the short rate, suggesting that the Indian central bank does intervene to smooth 
changes in call rate.   
However,  while  the  sign  on  rate  of  change  of  REER  is  correctly  negative  (as  the  Rupee 
depreciates 
 
fall in REER - ceteris paribus the central bank moves in to increase the short term 
interest rate) the sign on deviation of growth rate of M3 from target is wrong
27. If the growth rate 
of M3 is higher than targeted/projected, the central bank would be expected to raise the rates to 
curb the growth rate of money. It is an indication that money growth is endogenous in India, and 
that it responds to changes in interest rate and demand for credit. Das and Mandal (2000) found 
that short term interest rates are superexogenous w.r.t parameters of the demand M3 is evidence in 
support. Thus, it is the reduction in rate that leads to a higher growth rate of money. In the light of 
this a rule cast in terms of monetary base would be more appropriate.  
But where the forward looking versions fail both to capture the direction of movements in the call 
rate (the null of overidentifying restrictions in all cases is satisfied, indicating that choice of 
instruments is not flawed) and a reasonable value of the implied inflation target, the backward 
looking versions do a fairly good job of capturing the temporal evolution of the short-rate post 
1996-97  (before  which  it  is  the  autoregressive  nature  of  the  short-rate  which  seems  to  be 
predominant), and also provide a reasonable estimate of the implied inflation target. The most 
plausible estimates are for the case with trimmed mean used as the numeraire for inflation, with 
deviation of money growth from target and change in exchange rate as additional explanatory 
variables. Results add to the credence that RBI has been following a  multiple indicator targeting 
since 1996-97.  
Both the value of the coefficient and the t-statistic on output gap indicates that RBI - at least for 
the  sample  under  consideration  -  has  not  being  paying  much  attention  to  the  output  gap 
independently of inflation. A negative 
 
is a sign that the central bank  allows  for persistence in 
inflation accommodating changes in inflation and does not let the real rate rise too much in 
response to decrease in expected inflation. Though, it must be pointed out that a rule with (1 + 
) < 1 when incorporated in a standard new Keynesian IS curve, Phillips curve formulation 
leads to instability (see CGG, 2000, McCallum and Nelson, 1999a, 1999b, and McCallum, 2001). 
                                                
 
27 Even in regressions with growth rate of M3 as the explanatory variable the sign of the coefficient was negative Introduction  of  dummy  in  both  the  full  sample  and  the  truncated  sample  turns  out  to  be 
statistically significant. Most important change in results is significance of output gap after Dr. 
Jalan took over, and a drastic fall in quantitative importance of money in the reaction function 
(with a near zero value of the coefficient). Thus, while the backward looking Taylor rule in the 
truncated sample (with dummy) does provide a reasonably good representation of the evolution 
of call rate, parameter values (especially the value of the implied inflation target) and problems in 
estimating output gap in real time casts doubt on the applicability of the rule for real time policy.    
 
The McCallum Rule  
Similar to what is seen in case of the Taylor rule, for the McCallum Rule too, it is the backward 
looking  version  (with  percentage  change  in  REER  as  additional  independent  variable)  which 
comes forth as the best choice with the selection of numeraire for inflation not playing a major 
role here. Also, contrary to what was noticed in the case of the Taylor rule, nominal output 
gap
28  is  statistically  significant,  and  that  with  the  correct  sign
29.  Thus,  RBI  seems  to  have 
nominal income as its implicit final target while conducting monetary policy.  
Another  difference  is  that  introduction  of  dummy  in  the  McCallum  rule  turns  out  to  be 
insignificant.  Also,  unlike  for  Taylor  rule,  both  GMM  1  and  GMM  4  versions  provide  a 
reasonably good representation of movements in adjusted monetary base in the truncated sample 
(overidentifying  conditions  are  satisfied  as  in  case  of  Taylor  rule).  But  even  in  the  forward 
looking versions, the forward looking variable is insignificant.   
What is bothering, however, is the unreasonably high value of the implied inflation target in the 
range of 10-11%, even for a growing economy like India. This could be because a substantial 
portion  of  the  sample  belongs  to  the  period  when  quarterly  inflation  was  well  above  5%. 
However, while implied inflation target is on the higher side, if we look at the implied nominal 
income growth rate, it comes out to be around 14-16%, which though still on the higher side, is 
not as disturbing given that Indian economy is still in the developing phase.  
                                                
 
28 More correct terminology would be deviation from target; here  gap  is used for ease of articulation, and to facilitate 
comparison with output gap as used in Taylor rule. 
29 Changes in REER with a negative sign indicates that depreciation (fall in REER) makes the central bank increase the 
short term rate inviting more capital, thereby leading to an ex post rise in monetary base If we look at the full sample, for the first three quarters of 1998, where sticking to the rule would 
require a loosening of the economy, as noted earlier, in practice RBI increased the CRR to curb 
the fear of contagion in response to speculations in the foreign exchange market.   
Save this period, the McCallum rule provides a reasonably good representation of the movement 
of monetary base. The results only seem to be validated by the recent declarations of the RBI. 
The central bank has declared (see Annual Reports for the years 2001-02 and 2002-03) that it is 
using monetary base as its operating target.   
Theoretically, using monetary base as the operating target can give rise to highly volatile short 
term interest rates. Add to that, in presence of an unstable money multiplier it seemingly becomes 
a  highly  ineffective  strategy  of  monetary  policy  if  the  intermediate  target  is  some  monetary 
aggregate (which, though, RBI has denied in its Annual Reports since 1997-98), not to mention 
the complications in the light of high short term capital inflows. Sticking to monetary base as the 
operating target is a sign that RBI believes in the strength of the credit channel of monetary 
transmission. As RBI in its 2002-03 Annual Report states:  
In recent years, reserve money has become the operating target of monetary policy in 
the  endeavor  to  stabilize  the  demand  for  bank  reserves  and,  thereby,  to  create  conditions 




Going only by the graphic representation, all in all, monetary base does a much better job of 
mimicking the action of the central bank than the Taylor rule. Since the nominal output  gap  is 
insignificant in the forward looking rules, RBI does seem to be backward looking (which is not 
necessarily a bad thing, in the light of what Levin, Wieland and Williams (1997) and Estrella and 
Fuhrer (2002, 2003) find; that backward looking rules stabilize output and inflation better than 
their  forecast-based  counterparts).   
While the Taylor rule requires the estimate of unobserved real time (and forecasts, depending on 
the specification of the rule) of output gap, whose conceptualization as well as measurement is far 
from settled in the literature (McCallum and Nelson, 1999b), the McCallum rule poses no such 
problem. Also, Orphanides et al (2000) and McCallum (2001) show that a McCallum rule analog 
                                                
 
30 RBI Annual Report 2002-03 p. 36 using short term interest rate as the operating target stabilize output and inflation reasonably well 
(with performance better than Taylor rule) under uncertainity. This is encouraging in the Indian 
context.    
VII. Conclusion  
From the results it seems that RBI has been conducting its monetary policy as if it were targeting 
nominal  income.  The  McCallum  rule  based  on  nominal  income  targeting  does  explain  the 
behaviour of reserve money fairly closely.    
One final exercise I do  is to  assess the out-of-sample  performance
31  of the rule (backward 
looking, in truncated sample and using WPI as the measure for inflation) to see how well the 






Sample Results: Are changes in Net Foreign Exchange Assets Important?  
Since growth rate of monetary base explains the stance of monetary policy fairly well over the 
90s, it would be interesting to see if inclusion of changes in net foreign exchange assets (NFA) 
of the RBI adds to the explanatory power of the rule. To see this, I estimate the backward looking 
McCallum rule on the truncated dataset with an additional variable as percentage changes in 
(contemporaneous) NFA of the RBI. Results are presented in Exhibit 9
32. While inclusion is 
statistically significant, quantitatively the effect is only marginal. An indication that while short 
term capital inflows have a marginally positive effect on the growth rate of monetary base, RBI 
has been quite successful in sterilizing the effect of inflows.   
Out-of-sample results from both the truncated and full sample
33 backward looking McCallum rule 
(including NFA as an additional variable) for the eight quarters after the sample in the study ends 
are presented in Exhibit 10. Results reveal high volatility of monetary base resulting from the 
increased OMOs of the RBI in the year 2002-03, mostly  arising out of increased short term 
capital flows during the period. As RBI reports, 
                                                
 
31 It may not be altogether to call  performance  of the rule; rather it should be what the rule calls for against how RBI 
actually acted 
32  Even  when  included  in  full  sample,  results  were  similar,  i.e.  while  inclusion  was  statistically  significant, 
quantitatively it was no different than when included in the truncated sample.  
33 Only for the sake of comparison; differences are only marginal Excess supply conditions in the foreign exchange market were reflected in continuous 
purchases of foreign exchange by the Reserve Bank and accretions to the Reserve Bank s foreign 
currency assets. The primary liquidity generated by this substantial accretion to the net foreign 
assets (NFA) was sterilized through active recourse to open market sales and repos under the 




Since parameter estimates are based on data which includes period before the introduction of 
WMA and the launch of LAF, as more data becomes available, going by the results in the study, 
McCallum rule should become a choice of monetary policy reaction function, given that RBI has 
declared monetary base as its official operating target.  
To conclude, performance of McCallum rule augurs well for the conduct of monetary policy in 
the Indian context. This study was exploratory in nature, attempting to operationalise the rules, 
rather  than  a  statement  in  favour  of  a  particular  rule.  It  would  be  worth  looking  at  the 
performance of McCallum rule in detail. If indeed velocity of monetary base has a stable relation 
with short term interest rate (as should be the case in the light of RBI s new found favour for 
reserve money, else meeting the reserve money target would entail potentially infinite variance of 
the short term rate) then a complete model based evaluation of the rule specified with the short 
term rate as the numeraire along with an IS and a supply curve would be very insightful as to how 
well it can stabilize inflation and output.   
                                                
 
34 RBI Annual Report 2002-03, ibid, p. 36 References   
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Exhibit 2 
[Output Gap   Different Measures] Exhibit 3 
[Backward Looking Taylor Rule]  
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 Exhibit 5 
[Forward Looking Taylor Rule; n = 1]  
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 Exhibit 6 
[Forward Looking Taylor Rule; n = 4]  
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(0.89)  0.99  0.0467  0.0471 











(0.32)  0.85  0.0457  0.0523 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]  
 Base Case w. Dummy (n = 4)  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ...
... ( ) ( ) ( )
t t 1 t 1 1 t 1 t 1 2
1 t 1 2 t 1 2 t 1 3 t i t
i 1 1 1 1 1 D 1 z 1 z D
















2 P  P[





* r P 
*
P 

















(0.1)  0.93  0.0399  0.2658  0.0436  -0.0051 

















(-0.16)  0.88  0.0484  -0.006  0.0424  -0.008 

















(0.18)  0.83  0.0481  -0.118  0.0409  -0.103 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]  
 Truncated (n = 4)  































(0.33)  0.88  0.0377  0.0661 











(-0.11)  0.91  0.0421  0.272 











 (-052)  0.95  0.0412  0.0646 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]  
 Truncated w. Dummy (n = 4)  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ...
... ( ) ( ) ( )
t t 1 t 1 1 t 1 t 1 2
1 t 1 2 t 1 2 t 1 3 t i t
i 1 1 1 1 1 D 1 z 1 z D
















2 P  P[





* r P 
*
P 

















(0.69)  0.44  0.0342  0.05  0.0436  -0.008 

















(0.53)  0.8421  0.0418  0.0005  0.0424  0.0004 

















(0.79)  0.74  0.0413  0.0425  0.0409  0.033 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]  
 Exhibit 7 
[Forward Looking McCallum Rule; n = 1]  
Base Case (n = 1)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n t 1 t
j 0
B 1 V B y 1 e
k
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 





















(0.36)  0.87  0.1249 









(-1.54)  0.69  0.1612 









(-2.16)  0.55  0.5579 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   Base Case w. Dummy (n = 1)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ...
... (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n
j 0
t n t n t 1 t
B 1 V B y
k




* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 
* y = 0.0694  ; 


























(0.82)  0.89  -0.127  -0.05 











(-1.89)  0.42  0.3123  0.095 











(-2.02)  0.05  -1.845  0.32 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   
 Truncated (n = 1)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n t 1 t
j 0
B 1 V B y 1 e
k
 
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 





















(-2.45)  0.59  0.1042 










0.51  0.1618 









(-2.27)  0.46  0.30 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   Truncated w. Dummy (n = 1)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ...
... (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n
j 0
t n t n t 1 t
B 1 V B y
k
y D 1 e
 
 
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 
* y = 0.0735  ; 


























(-2.49)  0.45  0.0842  0.0961 











(-2.42)  0.34  0.1364  0.0973 












0.3  0.27  0.1887 






 Exhibit 8 
[Forward Looking McCallum Rule; n = 4]  
Base Case (n = 4)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n t 1 t
j 0
B 1 V B y 1 e
k
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 








2 > 4] 
*
 









(-2.03)  0.56  0.1021 










0.42  0.1035 










0.33  0.1006 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   Base Case w. Dummy (n = 4)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ...
... (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n
j 0
t n t n t 1 t
B 1 V B y
k




* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 
* y = 0.0694  ; 


























0.53  0.227  -1.69 












0.64  0.1279  0.3599 











(-2.07)  0.69  0.1273  0.371 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   
 Truncated (n = 4)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n t 1 t
j 0
B 1 V B y 1 e
k
 
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 








2 > 4] 
*
 









(-2.35)  0.53  0.1169 









(-3.47)  0.57  0.1271 










0.5  0.1381 
[t-values given in parentheses correspond to the coefficients as they appear in the regression and not the parameters]   Truncated w. Dummy (n = 4)  
. . . (1 )
( ) (1 )( ) ...
... (1 )( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t n t n
j 0
t n t n t 1 t
B 1 V B y
k
y D 1 e
 
 
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 
* y = 0.0735  ; 


























0.39  0.1213  0.2042 











(-3.28)  0.4  0.1136  0.1415 











(-3.01)  0.41  0.1267  0.2039 







 Exhibit 9 
[Backward Looking McCallum Rule]  
Truncated with NFA 
[WPI as the measure for inflation] 
. . .
( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
k
b
t t 1 t j t 1 t 1 1 t 1 2 t t
j 0
1
B 1 1 V B y 1 e 1 nfa
k
 
* * ( )( ) 1 y ; 

























(3.41)  0.27  0.097 









 Exhibit 10 
[Out - of - Sample Results]  
Truncated Sample  
 
Full Sample  
 